The last part of Bertrand Russell's discussion of the reasons people put forward for the existence of God is the argument for the remedying of injustice. The argument runs as follows.

1. The universe is ultimately fair and just.
2. Our own lives and experiences are often unjust, evil people do well, while the good suffer.
3. There therefore must be some means by which this is reversed after we die.
4. Therefore God.

I quite agree with Russell that this argument, as I have presented it here, or as he presents it himself is not the soundest ever conceived. I disagree with him about the relevance of this point, since it is not an argument that (as far as I am aware) any major Christian apologists has used. Thus this is just a straw man erected by Russell to poke fun at various naive Christians.

However, at the end of this section, Russell includes a few paragraphs on why he thinks that Christians believe in Christianity. Those paragraphs are worth discussion.

I discuss Bertrand Russell's presentation of the moral argument for God. This argument states

1. An objective ethical system is only possible if God exists;
2. We all agree that there are moral values;
3. If moral values are to mean anything they have to be universal and objective (i.e. not decided by the subjective whims of individuals or mobs but follow from reason and knowledge of the nature of beings);
4. Therefore God exists.

I outline a defence of this argument, and then consider how Russell attacks it.

I discuss Bertrand Russell's presentation of the design argument for God. I define the argument, and discuss its strengths and weaknesses, including a discussion of the usual arguments posed against it, and a few less usual ones. I also discuss what the design argument is not.

I discuss Bertrand Russell's presentation of the argument based on the idea that the laws of physics imply a divine lawgiver to give them the required order.

I begin by presenting the old argument that Russell was referring to as I understand it. Next I look at Russell's objections to this argument, and see how well Russell's objections stand against the modern forms of the argument.

I discuss Bertrand Russell's presentation of the cosmological argument, and the responses he offers against it.

I start by outlining a summary of Aristotle's version of the argument, as a backdrop to seeing whether Russell's responses are adequate against it. This leads me into a discussion of causality. One of Russell's objections is that causality is not all it used to be after scientists and philosophers got their hands on it. I list various forms of causality proposed down the century, and conclude that only Aristotle's version survives and is demanded by a comparison against modern physics. Thus Russell's seemingly most potent objection to Aristotle's particular version of the argument fails.

I then run through the rest of the objections that Russell mentions, such as the what caused God? argument to the maybe its turtles all the way down objection.

I discuss Bertrand Russell's introduction to the arguments he discusses which have been put forward for the existence of God.

Christianity is not only about belief, but there nonetheless are some beliefs which are central, distinctive and essential to Christianity. We wish to discuss whether Christianity is true. Since only propositions can be true in this sense of the word, the question reduces to whether these central doctrines of Christianity are true. But before we can ask that question, we have to first identify what those central doctrines are. This task is made harder because there are so many contradictory definitions of Christian belief held by different people who claim to be Christian, both today and in the past.

In previous posts, I have suggested that the best way of defining core Christian beliefs, indeed the core beliefs of any religion or other movement which is defined in part by belief, is to go back to what the founders of that movement believed, and believed to be essential to their religion. If anyone can rightly claim to be Christian, it is those people, so their voice carries more weight than those who followed them.

In this post, I expand on this means of definition, and respond to a few objections.

I take a look at four heresies that existed up to the end of the fourth century, Donatism, Pelagianism, Arianism, and Gnosticism. I do so to illustrate a discussion which serves several purposes. Firstly to emphasise that theological diversity is not a new phenomenon; one could not in ancient times just point to the creeds and say that all all who claimed to be Christian would have accepted them. Secondly, to give a glimpse of why theological diversity is damaging to to the coherence of Christianity. Each of these heresies is at first glance only disputing a small aspect of Christian doctrine, but when we look in more depth, we see that they have implications that destroy the coherence of Christianity. Thirdly, to discuss how to distinguish between a Christian heresy and a non-Christian belief. Fourthly, discussion of each of these heresies gives an opportunity to mention important aspects of Christian doctrine.

In this post, I look at how one might define what a Christian is.

Bertand Russell was one of the best philosophers of the early twentieth century. He made outstanding contributions in the fields of the philosophy of mathematics and logic, and also wrote one of the best histories of philosophy. He was also a firm atheist, and remains very influential in modern atheism.

This is a introduction to a series of posts criticising Russell's essay `Why I am not a Christian', based on a lecture he gave in 1927. Russell was a pre-eminent enlightenment philosopher whose world-view was formed during the last days before the quantum revolution in physics. He was particularly disdainful of Aristotle's philosophy and theism.

In short, in his views on religion, the philosophy of science, and ethics, he stood for everything I oppose. In these posts, I intend to show why he was wrong.